INTRODUCTION
T his paper considers a specific question that has been highlighted in recent years by the growing concern over the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs). How and to what extent should MNEs be subject to specialised regulation through laws and rules relating to their activities as cross-border corporate groups? In particular, should parent companies be directly responsible for the acts of their overseas subsidiaries by reason of specific rules of liability for those acts? Furthermore, should MNE groups be more accountable for their operations by reason of disclosure and governance systems that are adapted to the transnational nature of those operations? Such questions would appear to be exactly of the kind that a comprehensive review of company law should be addressing, if it is to be rooted in the realities of increased international economic integration encouraged by the transnational business practices of MNEs.
In the event, and rather surprisingly, the Company Law Review Steering Group had little to say on these very important questions. Indeed, the issue of corporate groups was introduced only at a later stage in the Review process and consisted of a single chapter in the November 2000 (DTI, London, November 2000, Chap. 10) hereafter Completing the Structure. In that chapter, there is little said by the Steering Group on the specific question of group liability for tortious acts of affiliates, let alone on the specific problems surrounding MNE accountability. More strikingly, the Final hereafter Final Report). In the meantime, litigation involving the liability of UK-based parent companies for the acts of their overseas subsidiaries has been instituted, and is continuing, before the English courts, raising precisely the kinds of issues outlined above. The principal cases, which involve Cape Pic and Thor Chemicals as defendants, arose out of the operations of the subsidiaries of these English-based parent companies in South Africa. In the Cape case, the litigation has arisen out of the exposure of large numbers of employees and local residents to asbestos mining and milling operations undertaken by the subsidiaries of Cape, with attendant consequences to the health of the claimants (see further Peter Muchlinski, 'Corporations in International Litigation: Problems of Jurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos Case ' (2001) The question of holding MNEs to legal account for the consequences of their unlawful actions has been a recurring theme in litigation over the past two decades. MNEs, in common with all advanced enterprises, whether national or multinational, have the potential to harm very large numbers of people through the use of hazardous technologies. However, unlike national enterprises, MNEs apply such technologies in their worldwide operations. Where such a technology injures people in the overseas location in which it is used, this may lead to transnational mass tort litigation, as was the case in relation to the Bhopal accident in India in 1984. Indeed, the consequences of this litigation have yet to be finally resolved some 17 years on (for regular updates on the current legal situation in the continuing litigation visit to to to http://www.bhopal.net/legal.html).
Consultation Document Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy Completing the Structure
It is the aim of this paper to analyse the principal legal and policy issues raised by such cases, as seen in the context of the business and industrial organisation of MNEs (see further Muchlinsk, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, revised paperback edition, 1999) at Chapters 3, 9 and 10). It is in the context of this analysis that the work of the Company Law Review Steering Group will be considered. Though, as already noted, the wider discussion of corporate governance and accountability in relation to groups was rather limited, the Steering Group did offer a view on the question of group liability in tort and also considered the question of accountability, in particular, by suggesting some new methods of group governance based on the concept of an 'elective' regime for groups. These matters will be examined more closely in the third section of the paper, as will the likely reasons for the Steering Group's reticence on these important issues.
Before that is done, the paper will begin with an overview of the conceptual issue of MNE parent company liability for the tortious acts of its affiliates, with a view to the development of possible arguments concerning the existence of a duty of care on the part of parent companies of a MNE for the infliction of personal injuries upon claimants at the hands of their overseas subsidiaries. This demands an excursus into the literature on the organisation of MNEs. That literature is vast. Furthermore, there is no single definitive theory of the growth and operation of MNEs, whether in economics, business studies or economic and business history. However, certain general themes can be identified and these can be used to structure an argument for the existence of the above-mentioned duty of care.
Attention will then turn to the issues raised by the recent United Kingdom litigation. Thus far judicial decisions have dealt with only one of the two principal issue areas around which MNE group liability is determined, namely, jurisdiction over the parent to answer for the acts of its overseas subsidiary in the host country where the alleged harm is suffered. 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE BUSINESS ORGANISATION OF MNES
In order to determine whether a parent company should be liable for the tortious acts of its subsidiary, it is necessary to prove that, on the basis of the relationship between them, the parent can justifiably be held so liable. In legal terms that requires proof, either, that the parent has acted as a joint tortfeasor with its subsidiary, as in The Amoco Cadiz, or, that the subsidiary acted as the agent or alter ego of the parent when committing the alleged tort. In either case the evidential basis for such a finding will emerge from the actual business organisation of the MNE.
to o
Thus, in order to develop a clear theory of parent company responsibility, it is, first, necessary to understand something of that organisation. 
1). This last definition distinguishes an enterprise that engages in direct investment
that is investment which gives the enterprise not only a financial stake in the foreign venture but also managerial control from one that engages in portfolio investment, which gives the investing enterprise only a financial stake in the foreign venture without any managerial control. Thus the MNE is a firm that engages in direct investment outside its home country. The term 'enterprise' is favoured over 'corporation' as it avoids restricting the object of study to incorporated business entities and to corporate groups based on parent/subsidiary relations alone. International production can take numerous legal forms. From an economic perspective the legal form is not crucial to the classification of an enterprise as 'multinational' (see Muchlinski, mentioned above, p. 12). (OECD, Paris, 1994 , 1997 and Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, mentioned above, p. 13. The old version of this definition, which stressed control even more strongly by way of reference to the ability of one company to control the activities of another company located in another country, had been substantially adopted in the final version of the proposed text of the now shelved United Nations Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Enterprises, UN Doc. No. E/1990/94 (12 June 1990), para. 1 at p. 5.)
The crucial characteristic of a MNE is, according to the above definition, the ability to co-ordinate activities between enterprises in more than one country. Other factors are not decisive. The definition is therefore, broad enough to encompass both equity and non-equity -based direct investment, regardless of the legal form, or ownership structure, of the undertakings. It also reflects the more recent trend in academic literature to move away from a simple, classical model of the MNE as a hierarchical 'pyramid' with the parent as the directing 'brain' of the company and the subsidiaries as its subordinate organs, with emphasis on line management though divisionalised corporate structures, towards a more flexible organisational form where subsidiaries are given more initiative over major decisions and to which significant strategic functions may be devolved. In addition, these more recent models stress the trend in more modern industries, that are not so dependent on [s] in an alliance) on the basis of general principles of tort, regardless of the precise business organisation of the enterprise, where, as a matter of policy, it is thought important for the duty to exist. Equally, liability for certain ultra-hazardous activities may be strict and the need for proving the existence of a duty of care may be unnecessary (as in the Indian doctrine of absolute enterprise liability for ultra-hazardous activities; see Muchlinski above in The Bhopal Case).
Thus it is not possible to offer wide and absolute concepts of MNE organisation. On the other hand, the law may develop through the use of presumptions as to the nature of corporate organisation, which may be rebutted on the provision of evidence to the contrary. For example, it may be presumed that a parent company, which owns 100 per cent of the stock in its subsidiary controls that subsidiary and may therefore be further presumed to direct its activities unless there is evidence to the contrary. Equally, the law could presume strict liability on the part of the parent for the acts of its subsidiary unless it can be shown that the chain of causation has been broken in some way. Such approaches are not unproblematic. In particular, they challenge the advantage of limited liability implicit in the corporate separation between parent and subsidiary (see further Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, pp. 331-2). However, as will be shown below, when the existence of a duty of care is considered further, such an argument may, in fact, misapprehend the true meaning, and legitimate boundaries of, limited liability in a group enterprise context.
THE CONTEXT: THE CAPE AND THOR CHEMICALS LITIGATION
Two main issues arise in relation to litigation involving alleged breaches of a duty of care on the part of a parent company for the acts of its overseas subsidiaries: first, does the forum before which the case has been brought have jurisdiction to hear the case, and, second, is the parent company liable for the alleged breach of the duty of care? As noted in the introduction, the current English litigation has been concerned mainly with the first question, while the second question awaits a judicial pronouncement. Each issue will now be considered in turn.
Jurisdiction
The first issue to be dealt with in all the recent cases involving English-based parent companies has been that of jurisdiction: were the English courts the proper place for the litigation on the merits of the case to be heard? In all o of these cases jurisdiction before the English courts was available 'as of right' because all the defendant companies are domiciled in England. That is: Cape, Thor Chemicals and Rio Tinto Zinc. See also Connelly v RTZ Pic [1998] AC 854, which has had a significant bearing on the Cape litigation. In the Thor Chemicals litigation, the English courts prior to the settlement of the case accepted jurisdiction for £l .3million in 1997 (see Ngcobo et al. v Thor Chemicals Holdings [1995] TER 579. A further 21 claims are now in progress against Thor. Again jurisdiction was accepted; see Sithole et al. v Thor Chemicals Holdings [1999] TER 110). However, in the Cape litigation, the matter proved to be more problematic. Cape argued that, as South Africa was the place where the alleged harm had occurred it was the correct forum for the case to be heard. Thus, the main issue was whether England or South Africa was the more appropriate forum under the doctrine in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansukx Ltd [1987] AC 460. The Spiliada doctrine has two limbs: First, taking account of all the circumstances and, especially, the nature of the subject matter and the convenience of the parties, which forum is the more appropriate for the action to be heard? Secondly, notwithstanding that a forum other than the English forum may be the more appropriate, will substantive justice be achieved by the hearing of the case in that other forum? Different courts involved in these claims arrived at different conclusions. In the first set of claims, that were brought in 1997 by Rachel Eubbe and five others, South Africa was held to be the proper forum at first instance, though this was overturned on appeal to the Court of Appeal in Lubbe v Cape Pic (No. 1) As to the first question, the House of Eords did not go so far as to accept enterprise analysis under the first limb of Spiliada, and conclude that, as an integrated MNE, Cape Pic was a proper party to the proceedings as a result of its actual or potential control over the health and safety activities of its overseas subsidiaries. Instead, the House of Eords came to its conclusion by relying on the second limb of Spiliada and finding that, in the light of the evidence submitted by the claimants, and by the Government of South Africa in its special submission to the House of Eords, the claimants' case was very unlikely ever to be heard in South Africa due to, in particular, the absence of legal aid and of lawyers expert enough and willing to take on such a complex mass tort action. That would, in effect, take away the claimants' right to a hearing. In this their Eordships were following the approach taken in the earlier case of Connelly v RTZ Pic [1998] AC 854, where the absence of legal aid in the foreign forum (Namibia) was held to have been a significant factor pointing to the conclusion that substantial justice could not have been achieved there, notwithstanding that the foreign forum may have been more appropriate on the basis of the first limb test. Therefore, it would appear that the House of Lords are developing a 'due process' approach to the second limb of the Spiliada doctrine. As to the second question, the House of Lords did not feel it necessary to deal with this point, in view of its finding under the Spiliada doctrine. As to the third question, the House of Lords expressly rejected the US approach, evident in cases such as Bhopal, of weighing die public interests of the home and foreign forums in conducting the litigation. 
The Existence of a Duty of Care
As noted in the introduction to this essay, none of the recent English cases involving MNE parent companies has yet determined the substantive question of liability for the acts of their overseas subsidiaries. Unless it settles, or is abandoned, before the trial date, the Cape litigation will be the first instance of this question to reach an English court for decision. In Part I of this paper it was argued that a presumption of parent company liability for the acts of its owned and controlled overseas subsidiaries could be established in principle, subject to rebuttal by evidence negating control. It was further said that the main objection to this presumption is that it effectively undermines the vital principle of limited liability. In reply, it is arguable that too much is made of the need for limited liability between parent and subsidiary when they form part of an integrated economic entity, as has been pointed out by When applied to involuntary creditors of die group, such as the victims of an alleged tort committed by the enterprise in the course of its operations, this extension of limited liability does litde more dian shift the risk of liability onto diem and away from the group. Can this be a justifiable result when die victims are uninsured, as was the case with the Cape claimants? Even where the claimants are insured, can such a transfer of risk from corporation to involuntary creditor be justifiable, given the risk of moral hazard implicit in such a policy? In relation to the Cape case, it is not immediately obvious why the cost of dealing with asbestos-related injuries should be borne by the local subsidiary alone, especially where it does not have the assets from which to compensate the claimants, given that Cape closed down its asbestos operations in South Africa in 1979. On the other hand Cape has enjoyed the profit stream from those overseas investments, and it would seem proper to make those proceeds available to compensate involuntary creditors where they can show that the parent controlled the operations in South Africa, and so could be held responsible for them. In any case direct liability might be possible on the ground that as Cape was aware of the dangers of asbestos mining and milling, given the state of knowledge at the time these Therefore, the issues relating to the existence of a duty of care, and of its breach, could be kept separate from the wider issue relating to the extent to which the parent company could benefit from the principle of limited liability as a means of insulating itself against tort claims arising out of the actions of its subsidiaries. However, that o is a position entirely dependent on the particular facts of the case, and on whether there is sufficient proof of parental complicity in the alleged tort. It does not remove the broader question of whether the economic entity of the group as a whole should act as a source of funds for the compensation of involuntary creditors, and of whether there should be such a thing as 'multinational enterprise liability' based on the integrated nature of the transnational system of economic activities carried on by the MNE (see for example The Amoco Cadiz [1984] 
